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This study examines the utilization of the current
United States (U.S.) Merchant Marine to respond to the
demands placed upon it by a full military mobilization. In-
cluded is a brief history of the Merchant Marine, its rela-
tionship to the National Defense Reserve Fleet and the Military
Sealift Command controlled fleet. Also discussed in the
analysis are the procedures for requisitioning the Merchant
Marine, the roles it might fulfill in wartime, and the types
of ships available in the present inventory. Conclusions and
recommendations are described. Of particular note is the
need for foreign purchase of vessels to be used in U.S. ocean-
going commerce, the necessity of establishing a national
maritime policy, and the continuation of governmental agency
interaction to study the Merchant Marine.
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The capability of the United States (U.S.) Merchant Marine
to support the rapid deployment of U.S. forces in an all-out
war plus maintain present raw material pipelines to the U.S.
is currently open to question. Doubt exists because of the
erratic history of the Merchant Marine throughout past periods
of conflict, when massive shipbuilding efforts had to be
undertaken in order to provide adequate shipping.
During both World Wars and, to a lesser extent, the Korean
and Vietnamese conflicts, the U.S. began each crisis with too
little usable shipping to directly support the fighting forces,
and also provide the materials back home to make the "machines
of war." As the wars progressed, the U.S. marshalled its
capacities and constructed the necessary tonnage. However,
in each case, once hostilities abated, the shipping industry
was allowed to lapse into chronic decline. Newly built ships
were sold off and shipyards were shut down.
The potential for history to repeat itself exists today.
Despite previous lessons and mass subsidy programs, today's
U.S. Merchant Marine plays only a minor role in international
oceanborne commerce, carrying less than five per cent of U.S.
foreign trade in 1979. [1:33] This means that the U.S. must
depend on foreign ships to carry 95 per cent of American
imports and exports. This reflects the relatively small size

and capacity of the fleet as compared to those of other
countries. In fact, of the 577 ships in the U.S. flag ocean-
going fleet in 1979, approximately 248 were actively engaged
in foreign commerce with the rest involved primarily in trade
along the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts of the U.S.
Given its present status, of what value would the Merchant
Marine be should the U.S. be called upon to fight another war,
a war on the scale of the previous World Wars such as a Russian
invasion of Europe?
Specifically, this research attempts to answer the follow-
ing questions:
If a presidential order were issued mobilizing the avail-
able privately owned ships, just what assets would be eligible
to be mobilized; what is the procedure required for this
mobilization to take effect; what ship-types exist; where
would they fit in the support functions required by an all-
out war; and would the present fleet be adequate to support
a long term engagement or would more massive shipbuilding
programs be required?
In seeking answers to these questions, the author intends
to describe a general history of the Merchant Marine, touch-
ing primarily on various pieces of legislation considered
significant.
After this background, a description of today's Merchant
Marine will be presented with up-to-date facts and figures on
10

its relative world position. Also included, will be a break-
down of the types of ships in the current inventory plus some
figures regarding their geographical utilization.
With the stage set as to numbers and types of assets, an
in-depth analysis will follow. In this section, methods of
acquiring ships by the government, the priorities involved in
their utilization, the roles of both the National Defense
Reserve Fleet (NDRF) and the Military Sealift Command (MSC)
controlled fleet will be described. Additionally, certain
support missions as related to types of ships available will
be addressed. Finally, within this section, data will be
presented on certain military tests conducted in recent years
concerning the use of the Merchant Fleet.
The last section will deal with conclusions and recom-





Except for periods of war, over the past century, the
United States commercial shipping industry has been in a state
of constant decline. This trend has been in both capital
equipment, i.e., numbers and capabilities of ship types, and
in percentage of U.S. commercial business transported. This
decline has been in spite of the expenditure of great sums of
money through massive subsidization programs. Before discus-
sing the current situation, some historical background will
help show how today's situation came about.
During the history of early America, ships and shipping
suffered through growing pains that any relatively new in-
dustry might undergo in a new country. However, with plenty
of forests to draw from, the United States (U.S.) gradually
became pre-eminent in the building of wooden ships. Through
government sponsored trade agreements, the U.S., until the
early 1800' s transported over 80 per cent of its goods via
its own flag ships. [2:53] However, when steamships were
invented in the early part of the century, America declined
to take expeditious advantage of such vessels, leaving it to
the British to develop them. Instead, America dedicated time
and money to the wooden sailing ship culminating in the design
of the fast, sleek clipper ships in the 1840' s. England,
meanwhile, was investing heavily in iron steamships.
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The Civil War further stunted the growth of American ship-
ping through massive destruction of the country's ships. In
an attempt to avoid this destruction, shipowners sold off
many of their assets to foreign countries. As much as one-
third of the merchant fleet was sold outright during the four
years of the Civil War. [2:57] By 1866 only 32 percent of
American trade was carried in American ships. [2:58]
With the post-war interest in railroads and the opening
of the West, maritime matters received less and less atten-
tion by the government. By the turn of the century, U.S.
ships carried less than 10 percent of U.S. foreign commerce.
[2:58]
The trend continued up to World War (WWI) , with foreign
countries outstripping the U.S. in the development and produc-
tion of iron and steel ships. The English, particularly, due
to large economies of scale and protected by favorable govern-
mental rules and regulations became "undisputed masters" of
shipbuilding in the early 1900's. [3:09]
A law, passed in 1817 requiring shipowners to buy only
American-made ships, heavily restricted the potential growth
of the fleet. The basic problem, which still exists today,
was that high costs associated with American shipyards made
U.S. flag ships more expensive to purchase than the foreign
models. With higher fixed costs initially, these ships were
less competitive than those of foreign manufacture since
13

higher rates had to be charged to recover costs. Helping to
perpetuate high costs was the Seamen's Act of 1915, which
directed that the crew of U.S. merchant flagships had to be
American. American crews were traditionally more expensive
than the foreign nationals most often used on the ships of
other flags.
Laws such as these, while presumably benefitting shipyards
and merchant seamen, worked to the disadvantage of the indus-
try as a whole since fewer ships were built. For example, the
policy to protect American shipyards from overseas competition
raised the price of ships "to U.S. operators by 40 to 50 per-
cent." [3:30] The response of the industry was to maintain
utilization of out-dated technology so that as late as 1890
the majority of the fleet was comprised of sailing ships. [3:30]
In WWI, and later in World War II (WWII) , massive ship-
building efforts were undertaken because, at the beginning of
each conflict, the U.S. simply did not have enough vessels to
properly supply its allies. The Shipping Act of 1916 gave
temporary authority for civilian and governmental purchase or
lease of foreign ships in order to offset the wartime U.S.
shortages. It also spurred a surge in ship construction,
resulting in the mass production of over 2,000 units, one-
third of which did not reach completion before the war was
over. [4:5]
Two pieces of Congressional legislation, the Merchant
Marine Acts of 1920 and 1928, attempted to deal with the glut
14

of ships which choked the harbors after WWI. And they tried
to establish a clear policy regarding the Merchant Marine:
. . . That it is necessary for the national defense
and the proper growth of the foreign and domestic
commerce that the United States shall have a mer-
chant marine of the best equipped and most suit-
able types of vessels sufficient to carry the
greater portion of its commerce and serve as a
naval auxiliary in time of war or national
emergency . . . ultimately to be owned and op-
erated by citizens of the U.S. [4:5]
These acts established a system of trade routes to be sold
to American citizens, and directed that all U.S. mail be car-
ried in U.S. ships. [3:33] The 1928 Act further expanded the
mail system, establishing a subsidy program for mail carriers.
The subsidy was to allow these carriers to replace their
fleets. Some new ships were, in fact, built. However, des-
pite the combined efforts of the two acts, the 1920 's did not
have the trade necessary to support the equipment manufactured
during the war. So, much of the ship inventory was sold off
at very reduced prices. And, since there were already too
many ships on hand, no incentive existed for further develop-
ment of new technology at any great speed. The ships that
did remain in service all aged together heading for the point
in time when they'd all be obsolete at once.
It was the realization of this impending disaster which
resulted in the passage of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936.
This was the first new approach to the problems which existed
in maritime industry. Through programs of direct subsidy, the
goals of the Act were to increase the number of ships built
15

in American yards, provide jobs and high wages for merchant
seamen still suffering under the effects of the depression,
and to ensure a capable merchant fleet as a part of the over-
all defense program of the U.S. It also established an or-
ganization, The Maritime Commission, to monitor the industry.
The real impact of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 was
in the subsidization program. Now the federal government was
empowered to fund a large part of the costs associated with
both construction and manning of U.S. flag vessels. Two
separate subsidies were legislated. The first was called the
Construction-Differential Subsidy (CDS) , where the government
paid the shipyard the difference between what the American
yard charged and what a foreign yard would charge. The ship-
owner paid up to the costs of the foreign construction and
the federal government paid the rest, within certain limits.
Initially, the government would pay only 33 percent, but later
a 50 percent limit was imposed. This limit was in effect until
1960, when it was raised to 55 percent. The 1970 Merchant
Marine Act, to be discussed later, took steps to reduce this
percentage and, as of 1976, it was reduced to 35 percent. [2:79]
Certain criteria were established for a yard to be eligible
to participate in the CDS:
1. The vessel constructed must be utilized in
foreign commerce;
2. Crew members on subsidized cargo ships must
be American citizens;
3. The Navy Department must approve construc-
tion plans to determine the vessel's suitability for
use in times of national emergency;
16

4. The vessel must be registered in the U.S. for
at least 25 years. [2:80]
The CDS in reality is a direct subsidy of the shipbuilding
industry and not actually to the Merchant Marine itself. As
an example of the amount of subsidies paid out under the CDS
program, in 1978, $156 million was disbursed to various ship-
yards, bringing the total from 1936 through 1978 to over
$2.8 billion in federal aid. [5:97]
The other particular subsidy program under the Merchant
Marine Act is called the Operating-Differential Subsidy (ODS)
.
This is an attempt, through direct payments to certain ship-
owners, to offset the cost differences between running an
American flag ship as opposed to a foreign one (usually much
cheaper) . The amount of the ODS:
. . . shall equal the excess of the subsidizable
wage costs of the United States officers and
crews, ... cost of insurance ... and maintenance
over the estimated fair and reasonable cost of
the same items (less the cost of defense features)
if such vessels were operated under the registry
of a foreign country ... [2:83]
Additionally, the eligible ships had to be constructed in the
United States and be of the technology and size so as to be
efficient and competitive in foreign trade.
The bulk of ODS, approximately 85 percent, generally goes
to wages, old-age pensions and unemployment benefits. Insur-
ance accounts for about 8 percent and maintenance about 7 per-
cent. [2:84] The payments under the ODS facet of the 1936
Act were over $303 million in 1978, with a total since 1936
of $5.2 billion. [5:97]
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The Merchant Marine Act was designed to provide needed
shipping services for American manufactured and agricultural
products at rates comparable to those of foreign competitors.
The timing of the act was most opportune, since shortly after
its passage, the United States became involved in WWII.
As in WWI, the U.S. transportation industry found itself
with insufficient numbers of ships to handle the role required
of it. Additionally, much of the tonnage that was available
was destroyed early on.
So, the country embarked on another around-the-clock build-
ing program. Between 1940 and 1945, U.S. yards built "5,037
merchant vessels of 2,000 gross tons and over." [3:53] How-
ever, once the war was over and the post-war shipping boom
ran its course, the U.S. again had an overabundance of ships.
Passed in 1946, the Merchant Ship Sales Act allowed the
government to sell off many of these excess ships to U.S.
citizens as well as friendly foreign countries whose shipping
had been decimated by the war. Of those sold, 843 were to
American-flag operators and 1,113 to foreign flags primarily
England, Norway, and France. [2:91] The remaining vessels,
over 1800, were relegated to the National Defense Reserve Fleet
(NDRF)
. [2:91] The U.S. Merchant Marine fell back into a
period of decline for much of the same reasons as post WWI:
too many ships available worldwide, and a lack of business
to support this number.
18

The conflicts in Korea and Vietnam brought sporadic
interest in the merchant fleet but any requirements that mer-
chant ships couldn't handle were met by activating ships from
the NDRF, ships that were beginning to deteriorate rapidly,
since most were over 20 years old and suffering from disuse.
The war in Vietnam had held off the forecasted shrinking
of the merchant fleet due to its intense use during the middle
to late 1960's. A downward trend had existed since WWII, but
temporarily stalled, despite predictions by The Maritime Ad-
ministration (MARAD) , due largely to the Vietnam War. Table 1
shows the total number of ships, 1,000 tons or over from
1960-1973.
TABLE 1. TREND OF MERCHANT SHIPS 1960-1973


















However, once the war began winding down, the numbers of
ships decreased either through scrapping or internment in the
NDRF. The most drastic cut occurred between 1968 and 1972
when over 300 ships went out of active service. [3:206]
The 1936 Act had set the stage for adequate construction
of a proper mix of cargo ships, bulk carriers (oil, ore, and
grain) , and tankers (fuel products) . However, ship production
never became a gradual, regulated, planned system. Thus, in
1969 about 60 percent of all U.S. flag ships were over 20
years old and in that year, U.S. ships carried the smallest
percentage (4.6) of the nation's own cargo in this century up
to that time. [4:13]
The Merchant Marine Act of 1970 perpetuated the same
principles as its forerunner in 1936. Additionally, it took
into consideration the changes in the industry regarding ship
size, speed, and the movement away from a labor-intensive to
capital-intensive environment, this reflecting the advance-
ment of automation.
Pursuing the policy of helping to maintain American ship-
yards, the Act called for the production of 300 new vessels
between 1971 and 1980. £2:93] Promoting standard designs, it
sought to reach certain economies of scale as the number of
ships produced increased. Additionally, whereas before ship-
owners applied for CDS funds, the yards were now given the
opportunity to request the subsidies to build ships in advance
of any firm orders.
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The Act also allowed the Secretary of Commerce to pur-
chase foreign components for ship construction to preclude
long delays encountered waiting for American production.
With renewed interest and new subsidies available as a result
of the 197 Act, there was a sudden spurt in shipbuilding.
While the 300 new-ship construction goal has not been
reached, approximately 175 ships were constructed in the
decade of the 1970' s. [1:31] These new vessels replaced older
ones retired or sold overseas so that the total number of
ships available has not changed drastically. However, there
has been an increase in total tonnage available between 1973
and 1979. See discussion below.
B. THE MERCHANT FLEET - 1980
Today's active private ocean going fleet is composed of a
mix of ships which, as of September 30, 1979, included 577
vessels, totaling 18.7 million deadweight tons (dwt) , as
compared to 586 ships, totaling 13 million dwt on September 1,
1973. [3:204] The various types included in this mix are:
general cargo freighters, containerships, barge carriers known
as Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) and SeaBee ships, tankers,
roll-on/roll-off (RoRo) ships, and liquid petroleum gas (LPG)




Vessel Type Number in 1979
Combination Pass/Cargo 6
Freighters * 126




* Includes partial containers and break bulk ships
** Oil/Bulk/Ore carriers
*** Full containerships, Ro/Ro, LASH and SeaBee types
[1:24]
A sampling of some ships constructed in 1978 includes:
1. The 265,000-dwt crude oil tanker American Independence
2. The 125,000-cubic-meter liquified natural gas carriers
LNG Aries and LNG Capricorn
3. Four 164,000-dwt crude oil tankers
4. One 188,500-dwt crude oil tanker
5. One 26,600-dwt containership.
However, despite these gains in capital equipment, in 1979
only 4.1 percent of U.S. commercial shipping was carried in
U.S. flag ships. [1:33] Tables 2 and 3 indicate the trends
the U.S. Merchant Fleet has followed over recent years.
Overseeing the U.S. Merchant Marine are two federal
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As an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce since
1950/ MARAD is tasked with the promotion of the U.S. Merchant
Marine and America's private shipbuilding industry. To carry
out this task, the organization provides financial aide for
both shipbuilders and ship operators alike; sponsors research
and development; promotes port development and growth; nego-
tiates international agreements; operates the U.S. Merchant
Marine Academy in New York; and maintains the NDRF located in
various sectors of the country for wartime mobilization. [5:1]
The most visible aspect of MARAD' s functions relate
to the subsidies paid out annually in the interests of improv-
ing the maritime industry in the United States. From 1973 to
1978/ these payments averaged $500 million per year. [1:97]
2. Federal Maritime Commission
The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) is an independ-.;
ent agency of Congress composed of five commissioners appointed
by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.
The FMC carries out the following duties:
a. Regulation of services, rates, practices, and agree-
ments of common carriers by water;
b. Acceptance or rejection of rates filed by carriers;
c. Investigation of discriminatory practices;
d. Licensing of independent ocean freight forwarders; and
e. Rendering of decisions, issuing of orders, making
rules and regulations governing and affecting common carriers
26

by water, terminal operators, freight forwarders, and other
persons subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.
C. THE PROBLEM
The U.S. Merchant Marine has been called the "Fourth Arm
of Defense," supposedly ready to integrate with the Army, Navy,
and Air Force in times of conflict to protect U.S. interests
overseas, and at the same time provide a continuing supply of
raw materials at home.
In this nuclear age, when wars may be fought and won in
hours, there are still strong possibilities that conventional
long term wars will be fought. To support these conventional
efforts, this thesis assumes, requires ships.
The U.S. Merchant Marine is at an all-time low in numbers
of ships and despite the overall increase in tonnage, a case
can be made for the idea that a reduction of vessels in the
inventory has an effect on this country's flexibility to pro-
vide itself with adequate military support and industrial
supplies in time of crisis.
There is already a heavy U.S. reliance on other flag ships
since there are more than 1500 such ships currently working
the American trade routes, while less than 300 U.S. flags
operate the same routes. [7:13] The country would be at a
distinct disadvantage were these 1500 foreign vessels suddenly
diverted or cut off for some reason.
27

The situation becomes more critical when considering
that, despite the existence of approximately 7500 ships under
NATO flags, "almost all of the 250 ships currently plying
foreign trade routes would be needed for just the first con-
voys sent to resupply NATO (including the U.S. Seventh Army
and the U.S. Air Force in Europe) in the event of war with the
Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact Allies." [8:15]
Also, both government and industry agree that the ship-
yards over the short term would not be able to duplicate
previous wartime efforts. That leaves the U.S. in the posi-
tion of "what is here is what will be available."
Table 4 provides a description of the fleet according to
rough geographical utilization. The ships currently handling
foreign trade and trade routes are generally equipped to con-
tinue in these roles. However, those ships engaged in domes-
tic commerce would most likely require equipment and personnel
changes and training to adapt them to the different conditions
to be encountered in a trans-oceanic environment.
Assuming such limited availability and that a full
mobilization is sounded, and that America will need every ship
in the current inventory (500 plus) , what are the steps involv-
ed in acquiring these boats and what roles could they possibly
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In this chapter some analysis and discussion will be set
forth regarding the mobilization and utilization of the Mer-
chant Marine with respect to the following areas:
1. The procedures and priority systems to be adhered to
in acquiring segments of merchant fleet for wartime use;
2. The relationship of the National Defense Reserve Fleet
(NDRF) and The Military Sealift Command (MSC) in this process;
3. A discussion of the most recent large military use of
merchant vessels - Vietnam;
4. A description of some of the vessels in the current
inventory;
5. An examination of some sample missions merchant ves-
sels might be available to perform as well as a discourse on
recent tests of such capabilities by the military;
6. And finally a short description of "flags of conven-
ience" .
Based on the facts presented, the final chapter will deal
with conclusions and recommendations.
B. SHIP PROCUREMENT
There are two major ways in which the government can ob-
tain maritime assets for defense use in emergency situations.
The method used depends on the gravity of the situation.
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The first method is basically a commercial charter arrange-
ment where the government hires out the vessels needed to per-
form particular support missions. The machinery to do this is
already in effect since a large portion of Department of De-
fense (DOD) cargo is currently shipped on commercial bottoms.
The authority for this is the Armed Services Procurement Act
[9:20] which covers a whole range of commercial purchases and
leases, not just ships. This Act established a system of ad-
vertising and bidding to be utilized in obtaining civilian
services and materials for the government, and is one of the
cornerstones of the government's procurement system.
Second, in times of emergency there are provisions in-
herent in the Act which allow for bypassing the formal bid-
ding procedures. Any of the following reasons could be used
as authority to skirt the normal system:
1. It is determined that such action is necessary in the
public interest during a national emergency declared by Congress
or the President;
2. The nature of the emergency or mobilization does not
allow enough time for advertising; or
3. The nature of the needed property or service makes it
impracticable to let a contract through advertised competitive
bidding. [9:20]
Several types of contract options are available in the
current system. Time charters are established to cover a ship
and crew use for a specified period. Voyage charters are
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arranged to use a vessel for a specific trip or trips. Bare-
boat charters involve the use of the actual ship only; the
leasor would provide the crew. There are, of course, varia-
tions within and among these different types of agreements.
Although the Military Sealift Command would most likely
make the arrangements in an emergency, any of several govern-
ment agencies might be involved in acquiring maritime ship-
ping to support some segment of the crises.
Where the contract system is inadequate, ships may be
requisitioned. This may occur when private sector business
is so great that the proper types and size of ships are not
available. The use of this requisitioning procedure clearly
depends upon the severity of the situation. The authority to
requisition, which is to basically commandeer, is contained in
the Merchant Marine Act of 1936:
. . . The Secretary of Commerce is authorized to
requisition U.S. -owned vessels, whether registered
under the U.S. flag or foreign flags, whenever the
President proclaims that the security of the nation
makes it advisable or during any national emergency
declared by proclamation of the President.
[10: Sec 902]
Any one of a number of agencies could originate a requisi-
tion request. Figure 1 describes the requisitioning process.
For example, the military services, the Coast Guard, MSC,
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) , or various DOD
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All requests would go to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) where,
through a Joint Transportation Board (JTB) , the request would
be evaluated and matched against a large range of options
monitored by JTB. If the requisition can be satisfied at that
level, then there is no need to proceed to DOD.
However, in a true mobilization situation, the require*
ments would be apparent — every facet of the government would
be looking for shipping, and The Maritime Administration, in
conjunction with the President, the Department of Commerce, and
DOD, would have full authority to requisition whatever ships
were needed.
In a wartime situation, there will be many conflicts and
much competition for existing ships. To resolve these poten-
tial difficulties, a system of priorities has been established
based on the 1936 Merchant Marine Act and monitored by an
organization under the President called the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) . This staff arm of the Chief Execu-
tive "is responsible for determining policy for and coordinat-
ing the emergency plans and programs of transportation agencies
and operations as well as those of other relevant federal
agencies." [9:23) Basically, FEMA mediates conflicts over
resources. Comprised of senior government military and civil-
ian personnel, FEMA is the overseer of wartime shipping policy
plus the arbiter in transportation disputes. These responsi-
bilities are described at length in Executive Orders 11051 and
11490 plus amendments. [9:24]
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Below FEMA is MARAD which, as the agency tasked with
assigning specific vessels to particular organizations, has
to make decisions on such grounds as "(a) national requirements,
(b) essential military requirements, (c) foreign assistance,
and (d) emergency procurement programs," [9:25] among others.
MARAD would empower a special group called the National Ship-
ping Authority (NSA) composed of experienced shipping industry
personnel who would do the actual assignments. The authority
for the NSA dates back to 1951 when the Department of Commerce
first established the machinery to set it up. [11:145]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense,
looking out for military needs, must set priorities, make
allocations of military assets, and pass on to NSA requests
for requirements not filled by DOD vessels. Figure 2 shows
the hierarchy involved in this priority system.
In order to be able to requisition ships, the government
first must determine if existing DOD assets are sufficient to
cover the requirements of the situation. The first group of
ships to be considered are those of the MSC. MSC provides
sea transportation support on a regular basis for the Depart-
ment of Defense. Maintaining a small fleet of 27 ships, six
government owned and 21 chartered vessels, MSC is the initial
source of sealift capability in an emergency. [3:1] MSC is
also active in the overall development and coordination of
contingency plans for expanded transportation requirements
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during wartime by actively working with various DOD depart-
ments and agencies. These ships are constantly utilized in
peacetime and would form the core of a much larger fleet
required in wartime.
The next group of ships to be called upon would be regular
civilian merchantmen through standard charter procedures.
Should the MSC fleet be considered inadequate the government
would turn to the hiring of commercial vessels, if available.
The reasoning behind this facet of the procedure is for the
United States (U.S.) to offer business to its own merchant
fleet in order to support it before calling on the NDRF.
The NDRF is a fleet of 317 ships stored in three locations
around the country for use in contingency situations. They
are located in James River, Virginia (157) ; Beaumont, Texas
(49); and Suisun Bay, California (111). [1:80] Table 5 shows
the history of the NDRF since 1945.
Although these ships do exist, their number has generally
been decreasing over the years primarily due to the sale, for
scrap, of the World War II vintage members of the fleet. This
has resulted in considerable speculation that the NDRF, the
bulk of which is still over 25 years old, is inadequate in
today's environment to be of much utility. Several reasons
are given for this. First of all the age factor is most ob-
vious since the ships are old, the technology is old and not
many seamen are around anymore having the knowledge to operate
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these ships. And, if there are such personnel available, they
are most likely already gainfully employed and difficult to
obtain for this purpose.
Regarding manpower deficiencies, when ships were broken
out in support of the Vietnam war, there were shortages of
skilled marine engineers and deck officers. As a result, in
1969, 135 NDRF sailings experienced a cumulative delay of 649
days or 4.8 days per ship. In 1967 and 1968 there were a
total of 201 delayed sailings for an average of 3.4 days per
ship. [12:12]
In 1979 a partially completed study entitled, "Licensed
Officer Supply and Demand, 1979-1988", documented current
existing labor shortages and forecasted that the situation
would not improve in the future. Seafaring shipboard jobs
in 1979 stood at 26,979, reflecting a downward trend, as
compared to 53,880 in 1969. [1:73] [12:49] With the decrease
in the job numbers, also comes a decrease in personnel with
current experience.
It has also been stated that the current shipyards would
be unable to handle a large influx of these ships which would
almost certainly require yard services while gearing up.
Again, during Vietnam, activation of the NDRF took con-
siderably longer than planned. The first 14 ships took 21
days each on the avarage, while the next 37 took 42 days.
Shortages of parts, shipyard response capability, and the
degraded condition of the ships contributed to these long
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time frames. [13:42] Of the 172 total used in the war, 50
ultimately had to be scrapped, within two years of activation,
indicating that the intense re-work did not prove adequate for
anything but short term utilization. [12:31]
During the three primary buildup years of the Vietnamese
conflict, 1965-1968, 172 NDRF ships transported in excess of
6,800,000 tons or 28 percent of all military cargo shipped to
Southeast Asia. Commercial ships carried 15,400,000 tons or
65 percent and Military Sealift Command ships carried 1,700,000
tons or 7 percent. [12:6-10]
The number of commercial vessels involved during those
three years was 166 dry cargo ships and 51 tankers. These
were taken from a total fleet of over 900 eligible ships. The
result of this was that these 200 ships were not engaged in
the commercial market. Tables 3 and 4 reflect this decline in
business those years. This decline represented business that
ended up on foreign flag ships.
At the same time, the NDRF totalled more than 1100 ships.
Since only 172 were withdrawn, it could be expected that those
172 were the best and that the others could be cannibalized
to make them seaworthy. Given the problems involved with those
actually put into service, today's inventory of about 300
ships greatly reduces the options regarding a sizable with-
drawal .
Recognizing these problems , MARAD has recently made
efforts to update the capability of the NDRF by selling off
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the older ships and replacing them with more modern trade-ins
from the commercial sector. This ongoing program, although
not fully funded or supported has made some strides to keep
the NDRF ready. Table 6 reflects the amounts of money that
MARAD has allocated in the last several years for the preserva-
tion of the NDRF:
TABLE 6. NDRF BUDGET FIGURES 1972-1978
TOTAL
FY NDRF BUDGET MARAD BUDGET PERCENT
1972 $4.3M $ 507. 7M .85
1973 3.9M 455. 0M .85
1974 3.7M 531. 3M .71
1975 4.3M 586. 1M .70
1976 4.2M 593. 6M .72
1977 4.5M 444. 8M 1.06
1978 5.1M 549. 2M .94
[1:38]
In order to break ships out of the National Defense Re-
serve Fleet, several decisions have to be made involving DOD,
the Navy and the Department of Commerce. The Merchant Ship
Sales Act of 1946 provides the authority to withdraw ships
from the NDRF, but only if the threat to requisition commer-
cial shipping exists:
A vessel placed in such reserve shall in no case
be used for any purpose whatsoever except that
any such vessel may be used for account of any
agency or department of the United States during
any period in which vessels may be requisitioned
under section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of
1936. [10:93]
As stated, this means that activation cannot take place
unless requisitioning appears imminent. The underlying
principle behind this is that commercial shippers want all
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the voluntary government business they can handle. Since the
U.S. maritime industry has a poor competitive position world-
wide, it looks to the government for business on a regular
basis. Thus, the industry wishes to be fully utilized before
allowing more ships to be pushed into the pool. And the
government has adhered to policies geared to keep the merchant
ships busy. For example, a public law passed in 1954, still
in force, requires that 50 percent of all government cargo
being shipped overseas be transported in U.S. bottoms. [11:145]
Furthermore, a document called the Wilson-Weeks Agreement,
signed in 1954, between Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson
and Secretary of Commerce, Sinclair Weeks, has as one of its
purposes to prioritize the acquisition of sea assets and
services. While recognizing the MSC controlled fleet, it also
sought to protect commercial business. In part it states:
. . . The Department of Defense and the Department
of Commerce agree that it is essential that DOD
have under its exclusive custody, jurisdiction,
and control, a nucleus fleet of size and com-
position to meet current requirements. All'
merchant shipping required by DOD, in addition
to that provided by MSC, will be obtained ...
in the following order of priority:
(1) maximum utilization of available U.S.
flag berth (regularly scheduled) space;
(2) Time or voyage charters to the extent
these are voluntarily made;
(3) Breakout of the National Defense Reserve
Fleet;
(4) Use of foreign flags. [6:83]
This agreement is still in force today and is still ad-
hered to by the government. In essence it dictates that the
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U.S. government will make full use of merchant fleet assets
before calling out the NDRF or resorting to foreign vessels.
The threat of requisitioning can only become real after
all legitimate sources are explored. And then the priorities
as established by the various emergency boards supersede any
commercial arrangements
.
Additionally a new concept called The Ready Reserve Force
(RRF) has also been initiated. Started in 1977, this program
was to provide a sealift capability of approximately 340,000
measurement tons (MTs) by Fiscal Year 1981, with these ships
capable of activation within five to ten days for deployment
during emergencies. [1:77] This time frame is far shorter
than the 21-45 day window given for the regular NDRF, which
itself is apparently optimistic given prior experience.
To provide this amount of tonnage would take approximately
30 ships, each with an average capacity of 15-20,000 MTs. At
the end of 1979, MARAD had accumulated 13 ships in the RRF, a
combination of ten breakbulk ships and three container ships.
The RRF includes one Victory ship left over from WWII plus
12 other ships built in the 1960's by the commercial sector.
After the program began these ships were accepted by MARAD as
trade-ins on future construction. By shifting ships of a
newer vintage into the NDRF and RRF, MARAD hopes to perpetuate
this fleet as truly responsive. To test this system, two of
these ships were activated by MSC in 1979 and completed 24-




There are several different basic ship types in the mer-
chant fleet which would be adaptable to a variety of needs
and functions should they be called upon.
1. Breakbulk Ships
The trend of the 1970' s has been away from the more
traditional breakbulk ship with its large holds and its own
on/off loading capability towards new ship types, particularly
container ships, barge ships, and roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO)
ships. However, figures projected into 1981 by MARAD com-
missioned study indicate that approximately half of the 270
cargo ships predicted to be in service will still be break-
bulk ships. The other 135 will be a combination of container-
ships, RO/RO' s and barge carriers. [14:14] The breakbulk ship
has the flexibility to deal with outsize cargo such as tanks,
big guns, etc., plus the booms necessary to make them self-
sustaining, i.e., needing nothing more than a dock on which
to set materials. Although reliable, the cargo handling pro-
cedures of this ship type are relatively slow compared to the
more modern ships, thus adversely affecting system turn-around











Container ships, capable of carrying cargo in pre-
packaged metal containers (20 or 40 feet long by 8 feet high
by 8 feet wide) similar to standard truck bodies, have come
of age in the 1970's. Although lacking the flexibility to
carry out-sized cargo, these ships make up in volume and
handling speed what they may lack in adaptability. Generally
they're of two types: Self-sustaining (SS) , utilizing onboard
crane facilities, or non-self sustaining (NSS) , requiring
elaborate shore support to offload. The trend is more towards
the NSS type in today's commercial world. A typical con-
tainer ship has the following dimensions:
Length: 650-700 feet
Beam: 90 feet
No. Boxes Carried: 1500-2000
Speed: 20-25 knots
Cargo Capacity: 30-35,000 tons
The holds of these ships consist of steel rails or guides
from main deck to the bottom. The containers slide securely
down the tracks sometimes stacking up to 11 high, depending
on the ship.
3. RO/RO Ships
A new concept in shipping is that of the Roll on/
Roll off (RO/RO) ship. Essentially floating barges, these
ships can handle most anything on wheels and thus have
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excellent military application. RO/RO's evolved from a
combination of car ferries and WWII Landing Ship, Tanks (LST's).
Because the military is highly enthusiastic over their
use, RO/RO's are now under study as an integral part of future
wartime support. In fact MARAD recently added the 500 foot
long ATLANTIC BEAR to the NDRF. [9:77] RO/RO's in service at






In the current inventory of ships, the Lighter-aboard-
ship (LASH) and the Sea Barge (SEABEE) have definite promise
for future military use. Like the container ship, the main
hull is essentially open for the carrying of barges and lighters
which are pre-loaded, floated to the hull and lifted aboard
with either a crane or elevator system.
These systems have several advantages. They load and
unload fast, they can carry outsize loads, and they can stand
offshore to accomplish their mission.
However, they still require some sort of power craft to
move the barges from ship to shore.








Cargo Capacity: 20-25,000 tons.
D. SUPPORT MISSIONS
On a continuing basis, the U.S. Navy and MARAD have plan-
ned activities in which Navy vessels must interact with mer-
chant ships. These exercises include wartime scenarios.
Examples of the areas in which Navy and MARAD seek to dis-
cover and solve problems include: 1. control of merchant
ship convoys and routing by the Navy in time of war; 2. pro-
tection of merchant ships by Navy vessels; 3. deployment of
military equipment on merchant ships; 4. communications
interface between civilian and military ships; and, 5. amphib-
ious support. Several specific missions have been the subject
of intense study.
1. Refueling s
Recognizing the need for fuel, the Navy in 1972 began
a series of exercises called Charger Log during which civilian
tankers provided on-station refueling of combat units. Sup-
plementing the Navy oiler, the tankers performed two missions:
one was delivering only to a Navy oiler which then refueled
the smaller units; the other was actual refueling of all task
force ships. This latter procedure resulted in the discovery
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of several difficulties, due primarily to the technological
differences between the merchant ship and its customers.
Merchant ships are generally slower, causing a potentially
dangerous situation should combat vessels have to slow down
to refuel, thus increasing their vulnerability. Also civilian
ships are not equipped for fast, efficient fuel delivery at
sea. That is not their primary function. So any system changes
made to allow fuel transfer are generally of a jury-rig nature
and therefore do not realize the pumping rates required.
Civilian ships have other deficiencies such as lack of
armaments and no place for them; and they have too little fire-
fighting and damage control equipment. [15:1-4,5]
2. Supplies, Food and Ammunition
Providing supplies, food and ammunition to at-sea-units
would be a definite requirement. The Navy Mobile Logistics
Ships would need reprovisioning on a regular basis and, again,
shore pickups may not be possible. Breakbulk ships would be
the best source of this kind of support since they have rig-
ging to transfer materials, and holds adaptable to specialized
palletized items. With the shortage of breakbulk ships, the
Navy has been considering the use of containerships for this
purpose. Although considered feasible for point-to-point
delivery, containerships have particular characteristics that
do not lend themselves to the underway replenishment of Navy
ships. Containers can be transferred by helicopter, but
studies have shown them to be difficult to return to the
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sending ship thus causing logjams on the receiving ship.
Certain requirements may not need a whole container and most
Navy ships do not have the capability to break the cargo down,
move it around, and re-containerize it. Some missiles are too
large for the vans and, further, there is only one ammunition
port in the U.S., Sunny Point, N.C., equipped to load containers
[15:11]
3. Other Missions
In 1976 and 1977 two exercises called TEAMWORK 1976
and REFORGER 1977 were conducted both of which involved mer-
chant ships in convoy situations plus tests of loading, trans-
porting and unloading Army equipment in Europe.
In 1978 joint communications drills called ALPINE
CHARGER and ROLL CALL were carried out between U.S. Navy,
civilian merchant ships, and NATO forces.
And in October 1978, NIFTY NUGGET a giant exercise
involving all facets of support for a major European war was
also executed. [8:209]
Other recent tests have included OSDOC (Over the Shore
Discharge of Containers) and LOTS (Logistics Over the Shore)
.
In these tests, merchant ships including modern container
ships and barges, were off loaded onto a beach totally lacking
in any port facility. Using its own cranes and barge-mounted
portables one breakbulk ship unloaded 600 tons of pile drivers,
bulldozers, forklifts, landing craft, shelters, and amphibious
vehicles. With this equipment the bare beach was improved to
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accept 20 and 4 foot containers from another ship standing
off shore. [7:7]
Tests such as OSDOC and LOTS have been described as
"successful" by their planners. However, they have pointed
up the need for specially constructed support gear to match
up with the ships own equipment to effect offloading. There
is at present not a large quantity of such gear available at
specific points to be moved to offload sites. The military
continues to expand these types of operations to attain more
experience and visibility to obtain adequate funding to cover
equipment deficiencies.
These and other tests continually conducted by MARAD,
MSC, and the Navy help provide workable solutions to the prob-
lems of matching current merchant ship capabilities with mili-
tary needs. Since the cost and planning dollars of these
events are limited, more tests which could be useful, are not
in fact feasible. By limiting the number of ships in such
tests, a large part of the shipping industry is denied the
training it may need. Only through reports and other pub-
lished information can most merchantmen discover the informa-
tion they might have to know in a crisis. [7:9]
The Maritime Administration, recognizing the problem
of the interface between various industry and military seg-
ments in emergencies, is in the process of developing a
detailed planning document covering all aspects of fleet
operations. This is being accomplished with the aid and
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cooperation of the Military Sealift Command, the Navy, and
industry itself. [8:210]
As pointed up by several shipping executives before
Congress in 1978, the issue of merchant marine support for
the country in emergency situations is complex. While the
operators struggle for survival in a highly competitive
business, the government attempts to prepare them for use in
contingencies. There is a natural reluctance toward this
since, whenever a U.S. flag ship might be called upon to sup-
port DOD missions, some foreign flag would most likely step
in to take the business vacated by the U.S. ships. Such
business lost may never be recovered. This thought makes the
owners wary of devoting too much time to military preparation
In fact, when civilian ships are used in various training
exercises, the operators are well paid for just the above
reason. Budget restrictions therefore limit the amount of
joint training which can be accomplished.
E. FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE
A discussion of the U.S. Merchant Marine would not be
complete without mention of a significant number of ships
owned by Americans, but registered abroad, particularly in
the countries of Liberia, Panama, and Honduras. Under the
concept of "Effective United States Control" (EUSC) , the
owners of these ships enter into agreements with MARAD to
make their vessels available in times of emergency. For
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this agreement they are provided special insurance programs
.
As of 1977, 339 tankers, 102 bulk carriers, and 28 liners
representing over 20 million deadweight tons, were designated
as EUSC vessels. [1:71]
The EUSC was created as a result of the Neutrality Act of
1939 according to which, the United States could not transport
military cargo to the Allies in American bottoms. To circum-
vent the law, the government encouraged American ship owners
to transfer ships to the registries of friendly, neutral,
foreign countries. The U.S. then continued to utilize these
ships up to and during WWII.
Today, ship operators continue to maintain foreign registry
due to the cheap foreign labor, less stringent safety require-
ments, and greater freedom from governmental regulation and
interference.
While the flags of convenience represent a sizable force
which by agreement may be used by the U.S. in crises, in
reality, much controversy has been raised over the true avail-
ability of these vessels and the potential benefit they might
serve. The EUSC fleet is scattered throughout the world and,
therefore, control over such ships is very decentralized and
weak. Additionally, this fleet is manned by multinational
crews whose loyalties may be inconsistent with those of the
U.S. and, hence, make these seamen unreliable.
Also, since most EUSC ships are not subject to American
government and military inspection and not built in U.S. ship-
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yards, their military value is difficult to determine at any
given time.
And, finally, with the world situation that exists today,
it is hard to predict with any real accuracy what the coun-
tries of registry themselves might do if counted on to coop-
erate with this country and provide this fleet. The EUSC
exists, the ships are real and have the potential to be a
potent force should the need arise. However, the actual
acquisition of these assets may in fact not be possible.
F. CHAPTER SUMMARY
In order to mobilize the U.S. Merchant Marine in times of
crisis, certain procedures and priorities involving all levels
of government have to be followed. The authority to requisi-
tion exists but such a step must include consideration of both
the NDRF and the MSC fleet.
Once the wheels are set in motion, the actual ship types
available and the kinds of missions they might perform need
to be looked at. To obtain the maximum utility from existing
ship assets, the Navy in conjunction with MARAD, runs assorted
tests of the ships and how they interact with Navy vessels.
Based on the above discussion the next chapter will des-
cribe various conclusions and recommendations in order to
improve the present situation.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. GENERAL
As seen in the last chapter, problems do exist concerning
a wartime mobilization of the U.S. Merchant Marine. The dis-
cussion of those particular problems leads to the conclusions
and recommendations that follow.
B. CONCLUSIONS
There is a need for a strong merchant marine not only for
the reliable transportation of American commerce, but also
for utilization in support roles in wartime. With the United
States (U.S.) able to carry less than five percent of its own
materials on its own ships, it could be potentially very
dangerous in times of emergency if the U.S. had to depend on
other countries to continue to transport U.S. goods as they
do now.
Additionally, since the U.S. does not have a reputation
for stockpiling raw materials, import missions bringing in such
raw materials as oil and a variety of metals necessary to
support wartime production levels would likely increase. These
increases would strain the merchant fleet and add to the com-
petition for available vessels with military planners.
While the Military Sealift Command (MSC) controlled fleet
and the National Defense Reserve Force (NDRF) could be called
upon, in an all out war requiring immediate response, these
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two fleets would be inadequate. The NDRF would be inadequate
due to time delays in activation and manpower shortages once
on line, and the MSC fleet because of its small size. Con-
sequently, the U.S. merchant fleet would have to be called upon,
It is difficult to say just how many ships should be in
the inventory to cover contingencies currently facing the U.S.
and its allies such as an invasion of Europe or a flare-up in
the Middle East.
Such statements as indicated in Chapter IV that "all 250
ocean going dry cargo ships would be needed in the first few
months for a European resupply" give some indication, especial-
ly if some factor for wartime attrition is figured.
Looking at almost 300 ships working constantly over three
years to resupply Vietnam also generates feelings of inadequacy
about the U.S. merchant fleet.
With the present U.S. commitments around the globe, a fleet
of 577 ships carrying only five percent of U.S. commerce can-
not be considered as a potent force in a total mobilization
situation.
As for ships in current construction programs, too little
is being spent to prepare them for contingencies. A $35
million ship constructed under subsidy may get a $50 thousand
defense package which usually means some deck strengthening to
accommodate a crane or non-self sustaining container ships, or
a small landing platform for helicopters. This is far too
little compared to the early 1960's when defense features
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included nuclear water washdown systems, extra generators
and fresh water capability, and weapons platforms. [8:227]
A number of government agencies, such as the Departments
of Commerce and Defense, the Maritime Administration (MARAD)
and the Navy have called for a coordinated national shipping
and shipbuilding policy. Despite the interest of such activi-
ties, and despite the Merchant Marine Act of 1970, no such
coordination exists. What does exist are fragmented procedures
and parochial interests which, to date, have not been unified
into one common plan. For example, the 1970 Act had in mind a
consistent, steady shipbuilding policy over the decade of the
1970' s. However, despite a good start when 48 ship construc-
tion contracts were let in 1972 and 43 in 1973, in 1975 only
14 vessels were contracted for while in 1976 only 13 were.
[8:320]
Further indications of disparity among goals between var-
ious merchant marine related factions can be seen in this
testimony before Congress by a member of MARAD.
. . . the failure of the current maritime pro-
gram to provide an adequate and well balanced
U.S. flag fleet is attributable to the fact
that the commercial market for U.S. flag ships
had generated a fleet inadequate for national
security needs. For instance our bulk fleet
can carry only a small fraction of essential
U.S. imports and the liner fleet has only a
small number of the roll-on/roll-off ships
which are the most desirable for support of
military deployments. [8:200]




1. The United States needs a strong, capable merchant
fleet which at present does not exist in those terms;
2
.
The NDRF and the MSC controlled fleets are inadequate
to handle the quick surge in shipping produced by all-out
mobilization;
3. There is no coordinated transportation policy in the
United States regarding the shipping industry.
C . RECOMMENDATIONS
The United States (U.S.) Merchant Marine has been in a
continual state of decline regarding its size and the amount
of tonnage carried since World War II. To bring it back to
the forefront of world fleets, able to support the U.S. in
both peace and war, new policies have to be instigated. Pro-
grams of massive subsidies have not kept the merchant fleet
from shrinking. Several strategies are suggested which might
alleviate the current situation.
1. Overseas Purchase of Vessels
One way to solve the problem would be to give more
owners the freedom to purchase vessels overseas. As an example,
in February 1980, Sea-Land Service, Inc., the world's largest
container carrier and frontrunner in the container ship revolu-
tion, began service with a brand new ship, the first of 12 to
be produced in Japan. Powered by fuel-efficient diesel engines,
products of advanced Japanese technology, and delivered far
faster than a U.S. yard would, these 744 feet long, $35 million
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ships are designed to compete with the flag ships of other
countries for the bulk of U.S. trade, which is carried by
these other flags. Because Sea-Land is not subsidized by the
government it was not required to build its ships in American
yards as subsidized lines are. [16:58]
Ships such as this will add greatly to the competitive
position of the U.S. plus offer better options for defense
planners. It is recognized that reducing domestic purchases
would have a negative impact on U.S. shipyards especially with
the recent Navy cutbacks , which leads to the next recommenda-
tion.
2. Coordinated Shipping and Shipbuilding Program
The United States needs a national, coordinated civil-
ian and military program to obtain the best ships, while main-
taining shipyard capacity for future contingencies. Existing
legislation requiring American cargo to be carried on American
bottoms needs to be updated and tailored to the times. While
it was passed to benefit the building industry, it has hampered
the technological growth of the fleet. An overall program
needs to be established to move both industries forward in-
stead of protecting one while hurting the other.
3. Agency Interaction
The various governmental agencies, DOC, DOD, MARAD,
the Navy, and Congress must maintain a constant dialogue in
order to highlight deficiencies and work on solutions.
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Parochial interests stimulated by budget constraints need to




And lastly, procedures that are defined only by memo-
randums of agreement as opposed to statute cannot be totally
relied upon. The current maritime organization has several
flaws in this area that need to be formalized Congressional
legislation. For example, the Wilson-Weeks Memorandum may not
stand a legal test in a crisis. The fact that it is over
twenty years old may indicate need to be replaced through for-
mal legislation.
5. Further Study
In conclusion, the problems associated with the Mer-
chant Marine require continuing attention and study. New
technologies and innovations need to be developed and explored
Increased emphasis on the relationship between the Merchant
Marine and the Navy must take place. And, finally, all mem-
bers of the United States government involved in this area
must work together for common goals, to ensure that the U.S.
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